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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 




STEVE GOMEZ and : Case No. 20520 
JACQUELINE GOMEZ, : 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners 
RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for rehearing of a decision filed by the 
Utah Supreme Court on May 6, 1986. Originally, this case was an 
appeal by the State of Utah from a dismissal of two counts of 
falsely making, coding, or signing evidence of a financial 
transaction card transaction, both second degree felonies in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-506.1 (1953 as amended), in the 
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Judith M. Billings, Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are set forth in the Brief of Respondents at 
1-2. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ARGUMENT 
In its opinion, State v. Gomez, 33 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (filed 
May 6, 1986), this Court has overlooked and misapprehended issues 
law presented by the Respondents. 
POINT I 
THE APPEAL IN THIS CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED 
BECAUSE THE STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS WAS NOT 
APPEALABLE. 
In this case, each defendant was charged with two second 
degree felonies. In the District Court, defense counsel filed a 
motion to reduce the two second degree felonies to one third degree 
felony and one Class A misdemeanor (R. 27, 56). Rather than 
proceeding on reduced charges, the prosecutor stated that he would 
prefer dismissal of the charges (R. 67). Upon finding that the 
lower charges were applicable, the trial judge, accepting the 
prosecutor's suggestion, dismissed the charges (R. 50-52, 80). From 
that dismissal, the state appealed. 
In their brief and at oral argument, Respondents argued 
that the State's appeal of the motion to dismiss was merely a 
subterfuge to gain review not of the dismissal but of the underlying 
reduction of charges (Respondents' Brief at 2-5 and State v. Gomez, 
Oral Argument (March 13, 1986)). In rejecting this argument, the 
Court's opinion stated: "The effect of the trial court's ruling was 
to block prosecution and, in effect, to dismiss the original 
charges." State v. Gomez, 33 Utah Adv. Rep. at 21. However, as 
will be shown below, this conclusion is clearly erroneous. 
- 2 -
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First, no question exists that the motion to dismiss that 
the motion to dismiss originated with the prosecution. The record 
supports that conclusion (R. 67) and the Court's opinion accepts it 
(Icl. at 21) . 
The trial court's ruling did not block the prosecution in 
this case. Another option was available to the state — the 
prosecution could have been proceeded on the reduced charges. 
Authority for a trial court to reduce charges in a criminal case can 
be found in previous cases from this Court. In State v. Hales, 652 
P.2d 1290 (Utah 1982), the Court stated: 
Where two statutes prohibit identical conduct but 
impose different penalties, an accused is 
entitled to be charged under the statute 
entailing the less severe punishment. State v. 
Loveless, Utah, 581 P.2d 575 (1978); Rammell v. 
Smith, Utah, 560 P.2d 1108 (1977); State v. 
Shondell, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969). 
(Emphasis added) 
IcL at 1292-3. 
More recently in State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257 (Utah 1985), 
this Court said: 
Therefore, under the authority of State v. 
Loveless, Utah, 581 P.2d 575 (1978), and State v. 
Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969), the 
defendant is entitled to the lesser penalty or, 
under State v. Hales, Utah, 652 P.2d 1290 (1982); 
State v. Clark, Utah, 632 P.2d 841 (1981); and 
Helmuth v. Morris, Utah, 598 P.2d 333 (1979), the 
defendant should have been charged with the more 
specific crime. (Emphasis added) 
Id. at 263. Clearly, a defendant does not have to wait until after 
conviction to receive the benefit of a lesser charge and/or lesser 
punishment. The duty of the trial court is to insure that a 
defendant proceeds to trial on the proper charges. In this case, 
dismissal was not the only alternative available to the prosecution; 
- 3 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the case could have proceeded to trial on what the trial court 
determined to be the proper charges. This issue was not addressed 
by the Court's opinion. 
As this Court noted in State v. Waddoups, 712 P.2d 223 at 
224 (Utah 1985), "The circumstances under which the State may appeal 
adverse rulings in the trial court in criminal cases have 
traditionally been limited by constitutional and statutory 
provisions." The state may not appeal an order reducing charges, 
however, it may appeal a final order of dismissal. Utah Code Ann. 
§77-35-26(c)(l) (1953 as amended). 
In this case, the prosecutor admitted that he could not 
appeal a reduction of the charges but that he preferred dismissal of 
the charges because "that's something I can appeal." (R. 67) As in 
Waddoups, the state in this case clearly attempted to circumvent 
what is appealable by the prosecution by "requesting a dismissal and 
relying on paragraph (1) of Rule 26(c), which permits an appeal of 
right by the prosecution '[f]rom a final judgment of dismissal.1" 
Waddoups, at 224. If the state wishes to broaden the circumstances 
under which it may appeal, it should petition the legislature to 
change the law; it should not attempt to circumvent the existing 
statute. See, State v. Kelbach, 569 P.2d 1100 at 1102 (Utah 1969). 
Finally, while no definition of dismissal is given in the 
statutory provision, it is not unreasonable to presume that an 
i 
adverse ruling of dismissal is meant by §77-35-26(c)(1). An adverse 
ruling of dismissal would be one which was contested, not suggested, 
by the prosecution. To hold otherwise would allow the prosecution 
i 
to routinely thwart the intent of the statute. Upon receiving an 
- 4 -
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adverse ruling by the trial court on any but the most trivial 
matters, the prosecutor would claim that the prosecution could 
proceed no further and that dismissal and appeal would be the only 
appropriate remedy. Such a scenario is an obvious violation of the 
statute and is contradictory to the clear language of Waddoups. 
Yet, that scenario is precisely what occurred in this case — the 
appeal was not from an adverse ruling of dismissal. 
To summarize, dismissal was not the only remedy available 
to the prosecution — the case could have proceeded on the reduced 
charges. Therefore, the prosecution was not "blocked" by the trial 
court's action. However, rather than proceeding on the reduced 
charges, the state sought and obtained a dismissal because it could 
not appeal the charge reduction. Because the state is limited in 
what it can appeal, it manipulated the dismissal process to gain the 
right of appeal. This Court should not allow such manipulation and 
should have dismissed this appeal. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OVERLOOKED ANOTHER BASIS FOR DISMISSAL 
OF THE STATE'S APPEAL WHICH WAS RAISED BY THE 
RESPONDENTS. 
During oral argument in this case, counsel for the 
Respondents contended that this appeal was improperly brought the 
Salt Lake County Attorneys Office. State v. Gomez, Oral Argument 
tape at counter no. 898 (argued March 13, 1986). The opinion in 
this case does not address this issue. 
- 5 -
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The powers and duties of county attorneys in Utah are 
described in Utah Code Ann. §17-18-1, which provides in pertinent 
part: 
The county attorney is a public prosecutor, 
and must: 
(1) Conduct on behalf of the state all 
prosecutions for public offenses committed within 
his county . . . 
* * ' " ' • # • * * * * 
(3) . . . the county attorney shall appear 
and prosecute for the state in the district court 
of his county in all criminal prosecutions, and 
may appear in all civil cases in which the state 
may be interested, and render such assistance as 
may be required by the attorney general in all 
such cases that may be appealed to the Supreme 
Court . . . (emphasis added). 
Similarly, the attorney general's duties are described in 
§67-5-1 which states in part: 
It is the duty of the attorney general: 
(1) To attend the Supreme Court of this 
state, and all court of the United States, and 
prosecute or defend all causes to which the state 
. . . is a party . . . 
* * * * * * * 
(5) To exercise supervisory powers over the 
. . . county attorneys of the state in all 
matters pertaining to the duties of their 
offices. . . 
* * * * * * * 
(7) When required by the public service or 
directed by the governor, to assist any . . . 
county attorney in the discharge of his duties. 
In State v. Loddy, 618 P.2d 60 (Utah 1980), (cited by Respondent's 
counsel during argument) this Court declared that the record must 
disclose that a county attorney is rendering "such assistance as 
- 6 -
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. . . required by the attorney general . . . " Further, an appeal 
brought in the name of the State by a county attorney in that case 
was dismissed solely because of the county attorney's lack of 
authority to originate an appeal. 
In this case as in Loddy, no authorization appears in the 
record for the county attorney to render assistance to the attorney 
general. This appeal originated in the county attorneyfs office. 
The Notice of Appeal (R. 47); Designation of Record (R. 42-43); and 
Certificate of Ordering of Transcript (R. 44) all bear the heading 
and signature of the county attorney and deputy county attorney not 
the attorney general. The only authorization from the attorney 
general's office is a letter, which is not in the record, 
authorizing a deputy county attorney to appear for the State at oral 
argument. (Addendum A) 
Because the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office exceeded its 
statutory authority in bringing this appeal, the appeal should have 
been dismissed. 
POINT III 
EVEN IF THIS APPEAL WAS PROPERLY TAKEN, THE STATUTES 
IN QUESTION PROSCRIBE THE SAME CONDUCT. 
The defendants were each charged with two counts of 
Wrongful use of a Financial Transaction Card, both second degree 
felonies under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-506.1 (Supp. 1983) (R. 18-19). 
The illegal conduct prohibited by this^section is: 
Any person who, with intent to defraud, 
counterfeits, falsely makes, embosses, or encodes 
magnetically or electronically any financial 
transaction card, or who with intent to defraud, 
signs the name of another or a fictitious name to 
- 7 -
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a financial transaction card, sales slip, sales 
draft, or any instrument for the payment of money 
which evidences a financial transaction card 
transaction, is guilty of a felony of the second 
degree. 
While conduct under the above section is a second degree 
felony, the defendants contended both below and on appeal that they 
could have been charged under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-506.2 (Supp. 
1983), which is classified as either a misdemeanor or a felony of 
the third degree. §76-6-506.2 states that: 
It is unlawful for any person to: 
(1) Knowingly, with intent to defraud, 
obtain or attempt to obtain credit or purchase or 
attempt to purchase goods, property, or services, 
by the use of a false, fictitious, altered, 
counterfeit, revoked, expired, stolen or 
fraudulently obtained financial transaction card, 
by any financial transaction card credit number, 
personal identification code, or by the use of a 
financial transaction card not authorized by the 
issuer or the card holder; 
The trial court accepted the defendant's claims and, at the 
state's behest to dismiss rather than reduce the charges, dismissed 
the charges. However, on appeal, this Court repudiated the trial 
court's conclusions and found that the two statutes do not proscribe 
identical conduct. State v. Gomez, 33 Utah Adv. Rep. at 22. The 
Court noted that §76-6-506.1 proscribes a fraudulent "signing" while 
§76-6-506.2 merely prohibits fraudulent "use" of a credit card. 
Further, 506.2 requires proof of value while 506.1 does not. 
The most significant difference between the two statutes is 
the "signing" requirement of 506.1. However, as was stated in oral 
argument of this case, the most common use of a credit card involves 
a signing. State v. Gomez, Oral Argument tape at 394 (argued March 
13, 1986). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Legislative enactments must be given effect according to 
their plain and obvious meaning. Statutory classifications of 
crimes must be based on differences which are real in fact and 
reasonably related to purposes of legislation. People v. Owens, 670 
P.2d 1233 (Colo. 1983). In State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 
1969), this Court noted: 
The well-established rule is that a statute 
creating a crime should be sufficiently certain 
that persons of ordinary intelligence who desire 
to obey the law may know how to conduct 
themselves in conformity with it. A fair and 
logical concomitant of that rule is that such a 
penal statute should be similarly clear, specific 
and understandable as to the penalty imposed for 
its violation. 
(citations omitted) Ld. at 148. 
Prior to the enactment of the present sections in dispute, 
the signing of a fraudulent or fictitious name in using a financial 
transaction card was clearly covered under older provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. §76-6-506 (repealed 1983). Indeed, the repealed section 
closely parallels the present provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-506.2 (Supp. 1983). The only changes in the provision reflect 
the classification of the crime according to the material value of 
goods involved. 
Logically, a prosecutor could charge a defendant with a 
violation 506.2 for fraudulently using a credit card by signing a 
sales slip. "Signing" is not excluded from the definition of "use" 
in 506.2. Therefore, the choice of which offense to charge is 
totally within the discretion of the prosecutor. 
- 9 -
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Furthermore, a defendant who fraudulently signs evidence of 
a credit card transaction could also be charged with forgery. Utah 
Code Ann. §76-6-501 provides: 
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined. — 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with 
purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that 
he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by 
anyone, he: 
(a) Alters any writing of another without 
his authority or utters any such altered writing; 
or 
(b) Makes, completes, executes, 
authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or 
utters any writing so that the writing or the 
making, completion, execution, authentication, 
issuance, transference, publication or utterance 
purports to be the act of another, whether the 
person is existent or non-existent, or purports 
to have been executed at a time or place or in a 
numbered sequence other than was in fact the 
case, or to be a copy of an original when no such 
original existed. 
(2) As used in this section "writing" 
includes printing or any other method of 
recording information, checks, tokens, stamps, 
seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money, 
and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, 
or identification. 
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree 
if the writing is or purports to be a check with 
a face amount of less than $100; all other 
forgery is a Class A misdemeanor. 
Thus, an individual who fraudulently signs evidence of credit and 
transaction could be charged with any of three offenses ranging from 
a Class A misdemeanor to a Second Degree Felony. 
In its opinion in this case, this Court noted that "[t]he 
reason for the distinction between subsections 506.1 and 506.2 . . . 
is rather hard to fathom . . . but we cannot say it is irrational or 
- 10 -
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arbitrary." 33 Utah Adv. Rep. at 22. In State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 
at 263 (Utah 1985), this Court declared: 
[W]e cannot disregard our responsibility to 
assure the rational and evenhanded application of 
criminal laws. Equal protection of the law 
guarantees like treatment of all those who are 
similarly situated. Accordingly, the criminal 
laws must be written so that there are 
significant differences between offenses and so 
that the exact same conduct is not subject to 
different penalties depending upon which of two 
statutory sections a prosecutor chooses to 
charge. To allow that would be to allow a form 
of arbitrariness that is foreign to our system of 
law. (Emphasis added) 
While the statutes in question do not have exactly 
identical elements, they do proscribe the same conduct. The choice 
of which of three offenses to charge is left entirely to the 
arbitrary discretion of the prosecutor. This is precisely the 
situation which Bryan emphasizes must be avoided. This statutory 
scheme is irrational and arbitrary. 
The position advanced by the trial court, that the proper 
charges in the present case should be brought under §76-6-506.2, is 
further bolstered by a policy favoring the defendant in ambiguous 
cases. Where neither the wording of the statute nor its legislative 
history points clearly to either meaning, courts apply the less 
harsh meaning. Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178-179 
(1958); State v. Shondel, supra. 
In Ladner v. United States, supra, the United States 
Supreme Court noted: 
When choice has to be made between two readings 
of what Congress has made a crime, it is 
appropriate, before we choose the harsher 
alternative, to require that Congress should have 
spoken in language that is clear and definite. 
- 11 -
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We should not derive criminal outlawry from some 
ambiguous implication. [Citations omitted]. 
Id. at 177. 
This policy of lenity means that courts should not 
interpret a criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it 
places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on 
no more than a guess as to what the legislature intended. Utah Code 
Ann. §77-17-1 (Supp. 1980), provides that if there is even 
"reasonable doubt" as to which of two or more degrees a person is 
guilty, they shall be convicted of "only" the lower degree. 
In this case, both attorneys at oral argument speculated on 
the meanings of the statutes in question. The court's opinion 
states that the distinction between the statutes is "hard to 
fathom". No legislative history supports the position of either 
side. All of the interpretations of the statutes in question are 
nothing more than speculation and conjecture. In such a situation, 
defendants should be given the benefit of the charge carrying the 
lesser penalty until the legislature clarifies the meaning of the 
statutes. 
CONCLUSION 
Because issues concerning the rights of the state and the 
county attorney's office to bring this appeal were either 
misapprehended or overlooked in the Court's opinion, the Respondents 
respectfully request this Court to reconsider this case and dismiss 
the state's appeal. Further, if this Court finds that dismissal of 
the appeal is not appropriate, Respondents respectfully request this 
- 12 -
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Court to reconsider the substantive issue presented by this case and 
affirm the intention of the trial court to reduce the charges. 
&&L 
Respectfully submitted this <7W day of May, 1986. 
NANCY BER^ESON 
Attorney for Petitioners 
Y V K ^ ^ ^ N ^ Y J 
KHRIS HARROLD 
Attorney for Petitioners 
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EARL F. DORIUS, CHIEF 
Governmental Affa , rs Division 
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Re: State v. Steve Gomez and Jacqueline Gomez, 
Case No. 20520 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
Please be advised t h a t in t h e above-referenced case , 
Mr. Gregory L. Bown, Deputy County Attorney of the S a l t Lake 
County A t t o r n e y ' s Office w i l l be appearing on behalf of the S t a t e 
of Utah for the o ra l argument scheduled for March 13
 f 1986 a t 
9:00 a.m. 
I w i l l be unable t o pe r sona l l y appear a t t he ora l 
argument inasmuch as I w i l l be o u t s i d e the s t a t e on t h a t day. I 
have au tho r i zed Mr. Bown t o appear on behalf of t he Attorney 
Genera l 1 s o f f i c e . 
Thank you for your c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h i s r e q u e s t . 
Very t r u l y yours f ' * 
K
^7J7^ 
'"' J^TfePHEN MIKITA 
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General 
Attorney for Appel lant 
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